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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,)

v.

HAMID HAYAT, and UMER HAYAT,

Defendants.

CR. NO. S-05-240 GEB

GOVERNMENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION REGARDING RELEASE ON BOND

I. IT WOULD BE IMPROPER FOR THIS COURT TO REVISIT MAGISTRATE JUDGE NOWINSKI'S DETENTION ORDER

This court has suggested that it may inquire into the propriety of that portion of Magistrate Judge Nowinski's order which finds that the defendants are a danger to the community. Before addressing the substance of that issue, the government respectfully submits that it would be improper for the court to revisit that issue. As noted in the government's opening brief, the Bail Reform Act states that a decision relating to detention may be reopened only if "the judicial officer finds that information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and has a

material bearing on the issue whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." 18 U.S.C. §3142(f). A belief that the decision of a prior judge was legally incorrect does not fit within this description, nor the similar requirements of Local Rule Crim 12-430(i). If the defendants believed they had a legal basis for challenging Magistrate Judge Nowinski's detention order, their remedy was to appeal that decision to the district court. Local Rule Crim. 12-430(j).

- II. MAGISTRATE JUDGE NOWINSKI PROPERLY DETAINED THE DEFENDANTS ON FLIGHT AND DANGEROUSNESS GROUNDS
- A. The Court Is Required to Consider Dangerousness Even Where the Crime Charged Is Not A "Crime of Violence"

The structure and plain language of the Bail Reform Act set forth a two-step process for determinations of detention. The first step is found in subsection (f), which provides that the Court can consider detention only when one of six enumerated threshold factors are present. The second step is found in subsection (g), which provides that, if a threshold factor is present, the Court should hold a hearing at which all the factors in subsection (g) shall be considered in determining if any combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person and the safety of any other person and the community.

The six enumerated threshold factors are as follows:

- (1) a <u>crime of violence</u>; § 3142(f)(1)(A)
- (2) an offense for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or death; § 3142(f)(1)(B)
- (3) an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled

Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the <u>Controlled Substances</u> Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.); § 3142(f)(1)(C)

- (4) any felony if such person has been convicted of two or more offenses described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of this paragraph, or two or more State or local offenses that would have been offenses described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of this paragraph if a circumstance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed, or a combination of such offenses; § 3142(f)(1)(D)
- (5) a serious <u>risk that such person will flee;</u>
 § 3142(f)(2)(A)
- (6) a serious <u>risk that such person will obstruct or</u>
 <u>attempt to obstruct justice</u>, or threaten, injure, or
 intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure, or
 intimidate, a prospective witness or juror. §
 3142(f)(2)(B)

18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (emphasis added).

The statute indicates that, in order to conduct a detention hearing, the Court must look at the overall case and find that one of these 6 enumerated factors is present. The Court can find anyone of the six factors. For example, the Court may find "risk of flight" based on a prior conviction, or a demonstrated flagrant disregard for prior court orders of periods of supervision, such as probation or parole. It may find a risk of obstruction of justice, or it may find that the defendant's criminal history involves two or more qualifying prior convictions. If any one of the six factors is present, the Court can proceed to hold a hearing on the issue of detention.

At the hearing, the Court "shall" consider the factors outlined in subsection (g). Those factors are:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or involves a narcotic drug;

- (2) the weight of the evidence against the person;
- the history and characteristics of the person, (3) including--(A) the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and (B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law;
- (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release.

18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (emphasis added).

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Once the factors outlined in subsection (g) have been considered, the court should make the findings outlined in subsection (e), <u>i.e.</u>, whether conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required <u>and</u> the safety of any other person and the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (e). The Court "shall" consider dangerousness to the community in doing so.

Hence, the first task of the judicial officer is to determine if one of six circumstances exist which trigger a detention hearing. Absent one of these circumstances, detention is not an option. Second, assuming a hearing is appropriate, the judicial officer must consider several enumerated factors to determine whether conditions short of detention will 'reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.' 18 U.S.C. § 3142(q).

The Ninth Circuit, as well as other Circuits, have uniformly held that the Bail Reform Act does not authorize pretrial detention

based solely on a finding of dangerousness. <u>United States v. Twine</u>, 344 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that "Our interpretation is in accord with our sister circuits who have ruled on this issue. <u>See United States v. Byrd</u>, 969 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1992); <u>United States v. Ploof</u>, 851 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.1988); <u>United States v. Himler</u>, 797 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1986).

The Ninth Circuit has not expressly indicated what factors would trigger a detention hearing and, ultimately can support a detention decision. Other Circuits, including those cited as authority by the Ninth Circuit, have reached this issue. These courts have uniformly held that a detention hearing is authorized when any one of the six circumstances listed in section 3142(f)(1) and (2) is present, including flight. These courts have further held that detention can be ordered in a case that involves one of those factors in which the judicial officer concludes that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.

For example, in <u>United States v. Byrd</u>, 969 F.2d 106, 109-10 10 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit expressly held that "§ 3142(f) does not authorize a detention hearing whenever the government thinks detention would be desirable, but rather limits such hearings to the [six circumstances listed in (f)(1)(A), (f)(1)(B), (f)(1)(C), (f)(1)(D), (f)(2)(A) and (f)(2)(B)]." It noted that, "A hearing can be held only if one of the six circumstances listed in (f)(1) and (2) is present" and that "[d]etention can be ordered, therefore, only 'in a case that involves' one of the six circumstances listed in (f), and in which the judicial officer finds, after a hearing,

that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." Id. (detention denied because "[t]he government has not shown ... that any one of the six listed circumstances that warrants pre-trial detention is present in this case."). See also U.S. v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("The Act establishes procedures for each form of release, as well as for temporary and pretrial detention.... First, a judicial officer must find one of six circumstances triggering a detention hearing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). Absent one of these circumstances, detention is not an option. Second, assuming a hearing is appropriate, the judicial officer must consider several enumerated factors to determine whether conditions short of detention will 'reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.' 18 U.S.C. § 3142(q). The judicial officer may order detention if these factors weigh against release."); <u>United States. v. Ploof</u>, 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1988) ("\$ 3142(f) does not authorize a detention hearing whenever the government thinks detention would be desirable, but rather limits such hearings to the following instances [listing <u>six</u> factors under § 3142(f)(1) and (2) including] "upon motion of the government or the court's own motion in a case that involves a serious risk of flight, § 3142(f)(2)(A);" "Congress did not intend to authorize preventive detention unless the judicial officer first finds that one of the § 3142(f) conditions for holding a detention hearing exists;" remanded for consideration of "whether or not there is a serious risk defendant will engage or attempt to engage in the conduct set forth in § 3142(f)(2)(B) and that no condition or

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combination of conditions set forth in § 3142(c) will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community"); <u>United States v. Himler</u>, 797 F.2d 156, 160 (3rd Cir. 1986)("[I]t is reasonable to interpret the statute as authorizing detention only upon proof of a likelihood of flight, a threatened obstruction of justice or a danger of recidivism in one or more of the crimes actually specified by the bail statute.

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In the recent case of <u>United States v. Fidler</u>, F.3d , 2005 WL 1950002 (9th Cir., July 21, 2005), the Court found it proper to consider danger to the community in a case which involved flight, but did not involve a crime of violence or any of the other triggering factors in §3142(f)(1). In that case, Fidler was charged with criminal contempt for violating a court order in a fraud case. The government moved for detention based on flight risk and danger. The district court instead ordered the defendant released on a \$300,000 bond. The defendant was unable to post the bond, and was unsuccessful in getting it reduced, and therefore remained in custody pending trial. He appealed to the Ninth Circuit claiming that the district court's order violated §3142(c), which prohibits the judicial officer from imposing a financial condition that results in detention. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the de facto detention under these circumstances does not violate \$3142(c) "if the record shows that the detention is not based solely on the defendant's inability to meet the financial condition, but rather on the district court's determination that the amount of the bond is necessary to reasonably assure the defendant's attendance at trial or the safety of the community." (Slip op. at The Court continued: "This is because, under those 2).

circumstances, the defendant's detention is "not because he cannot raise the money, but because without the money, the risk of flight [or danger to others] is too great." Id. (Brackets in original).

B. The Defendants Are Charged With a "Crime of Violence" Within the Meaning of the Detention Statute

Defendants are charged with making false statements to agents of the FBI. To convict the defendants of these charges, the government must prove the following elements:

- (1) The defendant made a false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the FBI;
- (2) The defendant acted willfully, that is deliberately and with knowledge that the statement was untrue;
- (3) The statement was material to the FBI's activities or decisions.

Ninth Circuit Pattern Instruction 8.66 (2003); <u>United States v.</u>

<u>Camper</u>, 384 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004); <u>United States v. Boone</u>,

951 F.2d 1526, 1544 (9th Cir. 1991).

Additionally, to make defendant eligible to receive the statutory maximum term of eight years, the government must prove that the offense "involves international or domestic terrorism" as defined in section 2331 of Title 18. That section provides:

- (1) the term "international terrorism" means
 activities that -
 - (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
 - (B) appear to be intended -
 - (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
 - (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or

(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and

(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.

. . . .

- (5) the term "domestic terrorism means" activities that -
 - (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
 - (B) appear to be intended -
 - (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
 - (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
 - (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
- (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

As previously noted, a detention hearing may be triggered under \$3142(f)(1) "upon motion of the attorney for the Government in a case that involves - (A) a crime of violence." A "crime of violence" is defined as "(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another; or (b) any offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 16.

At trial, the government will be required to show that the defendant's lies related to international or domestic terrorism, that is, that it involved "violent acts or acts dangerous to human

For the foregoing reasons, the government respectfully submits that this court should not reconsider Magistrate Judge Nowinski's

detention order, but that if the court chooses to do so, it should

find that the order was proper.

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